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Are dreams subjective experiences during sleep? Is it like something to dream, or is it only
like something to remember dreams after awakening? Specifically, can dream reports be
trusted to reveal what it is like to dream, and should they count as evidence for saying
that dreams are conscious experiences at all? The goal of this article is to investigate
the relationship between dreaming, dream reporting and subjective experience during
sleep. I discuss different variants of philosophical skepticism about dream reporting and
argue that they all fail. Consequently, skeptical doubts about the trustworthiness of dream
reports are misguided, and for systematic reasons. I suggest an alternative, anti-skeptical
account of the trustworthiness of dream reports. On this view, dream reports, when
gathered under ideal reporting conditions and according to the principle of temporal
proximity, are trustworthy (or transparent) with respect to conscious experience during
sleep. The transparency assumption has the status of a methodologically necessary
default assumption and is theoretically justified because it provides the best explanation
of dream reporting. At the same time, it inherits important insights from the discussed
variants of skepticism about dream reporting, suggesting that the careful consideration of
these skeptical arguments ultimately leads to a positive account of why and under which
conditions dream reports can and should be trusted. In this way, moderate distrust can be
fruitfully combined with anti-skepticism about dream reporting. Several perspectives for
future dream research and for the comparative study of dreaming and waking experience
are suggested.
Keywords: dreaming, subjective experience, dream reports, first-person reports, philosophy of mind, scientific
dream research, skepticism, inference to the best explanation
INTRODUCTION
There is a tension in contemporary philosophical writing on
dreams. On the one hand, dreams are commonly regarded as
conscious experiences occurring during sleep (Metzinger, 2003;
McGinn, 2004; Revonsuo, 2006; Windt and Metzinger, 2007;
Ichikawa, 2009; Sosa and Ichikawa, 2009). On the other hand,
dream reports are taken to be notoriously untrustworthy. Dream
recall is a fleeting and highly unstable phenomenon, and research
has shown that a majority of dreams are forgotten1. Such worries
are strengthened by different versions of philosophical skepticism
about the trustworthiness of dream reports. The reliance of scien-
tific dream research on dream reports is, on this view, an obstacle
to be overcome, resulting in the somewhat uncomfortable posi-
tion that dream reports, while crucial to the study of dreaming,
are less trustworthy than reports of waking experience (Nir and
Tononi, 2010, p. 89).
The goal of this article is to show that skepticism about dream
reporting is misguided. I argue that the reliance on dream reports
is not only methodologically necessary and a precondition for
scientific dream research, but also theoretically justified. At the
1In laboratory studies,∼85% of REM sleep awakenings result in dream recall
(Nielsen, 2000), but most subjects only occasionally remember their dreams
at home, suggesting that only 5–10% of dreams are spontaneously recalled
(Domhoff, 1996. p. 41).
same time, a recurrent theme of this article is that philosoph-
ical skepticism about dream reporting can be used as a foil
for constructing a positive account of dream reporting. Hence
my ambiguous subtitle: Taking skeptical doubts about the trust-
worthiness of dream reports seriously leads to an anti-skeptical
account of why dream reports should, in fact, be trusted. In
reporting dreams, we are actually reporting dream experience.
In the first section (“The Transparency Assumption of Dream
Reporting and the Experiential and Reportability Assumptions
of Dreaming”), I analyze the background assumptions behind
scientific dream research and argue that it is constrained, for
methodological reasons, by trusting dream reports. In the fol-
lowing section (“Skepticism About Dream Reporting”), I discuss
three prominent versions of skepticism about dream reporting
and show that they all fail to shed doubt on the trustworthiness
of dream reports. Because this failure is systematic, I conclude
that skepticism about dream reporting is generally misguided.
Then, (in the section “Why to Trust Dream Reports”), I use
insights from my discussion of skepticism about dream reporting
to defend an anti-skeptical account, arguing that inference to
the best explanation provides theoretical justification for saying
that dream reports are trustworthy 2. Several consequences and
2An early formulation of this idea is suggested in (Windt, 2010); a more
detailed discussion can be found in Windt (in press).
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perspectives for scientific dream research are discussed in the
final section (“The Way Forward: Consequences for Scientific
Dream Research”).
THE TRANSPARENCY ASSUMPTION OF DREAM REPORTING
AND THE EXPERIENTIAL AND REPORTABILITY
ASSUMPTIONS OF DREAMING
The experiential assumption says that dreams are subjective expe-
riences occurring in sleep in the sense that they are phenomenal
states, or that it is like something (Nagel, 1974) to dream. It is
implicit in Aristotle’s treatise on dreams, arguably the first system-
atic theory of dreaming and its physiological sources (Aristotle,
350 B.C.E./1994–2009; Dreisbach, 2000; Barbera, 2008) and lies
at the root of the epistemological problem of whether dreams can
be distinguished from wakefulness and whether we can ever rule
out, at any given moment, that we are now dreaming (Descartes,
1641/1901). It is also commonly assumed by contemporary the-
ories of dreaming, both from philosophy of mind and cognitive
neuroscience (cf. Windt, in press).
By contrast, the trustworthiness of dream reports only became
a target of philosophical discussion in the second half of the
20th century. This shift in the philosophical debate from dream
experience to dream reporting was not theoretically neutral:
skepticism about dream reporting was used to defend skepti-
cism about dream experience (see the section “Skepticism About
Dream Reporting” for details). Importantly, this shift revealed
the deep connection between the experiential and transparency
assumptions: Because access to dream experience is always indirect
via retrospective dream reports, claims about dream experience,
at least implicitly, assume that dream reports are trustworthy
sources of evidence about subjective experience during sleep 3.
Consequently, if the transparency assumption is rejected, the
grounds for endorsing the experiential assumption are eroded: if
dream reports are not trustworthy with respect to dream experi-
ence, then there is no reason to claim that dreams are experiences
in the first place. Indeed, the experiential assumption, on this view,
is a simplified and incomplete formulation of the transparency
assumption (see Figure 1).
A brief look at the beginnings of scientific dream research
illustrates this point. In 1953, Eugene Aserinsky and Nathaniel
Kleitman published a seminal article describing the discovery
of regularly occurring periods of eye motility during sleep and
their correlation with dream reports after awakening. Describing
the results of their study, Aserinsky and Kleitman noted that
“of 27 interrogations during [sic] ocular motility, 20 revealed
detailed dreams usually involving visual imagery” (Aserinsky and
Kleitman, 1953, p. 273; my emphasis) and suggested that the
3Epistemic transparency is intended in a non-technical, metaphorical sense;
in particular, it should not be confused with the thesis that the mind is trans-
parent to itself (see Carruthers, 2011 for discussion). Transparency is a visual
metaphor, intending to capture the intuition that dream reports are the clos-
est researchers can come to “watching the sleeping mind” (Cartwright, 2010,
p. 17). Transparency is also meant to reflect the fact that dream reports are
not identical with, but better conceived of as separate from dreaming. Finally,
transparency reflects the historical situation that the theoretical problems
raised by dream reporting were nearly invisible throughoutmost of the history
of philosophical theorizing about dreaming.
Experiential assumption:Dreams are conscious experiences in the sense
that they are phenomenal states, or that it is like something to dream.
Transparency assumption:Dream reports are epistemically transparent
in the sense that they are trustworthy sources of evidence about the
occurrence and phenomenal character of experience during sleep, at least
when gathered under ideal reporting conditions.
Reportability assumption: Dreams are reportable experiences in that the
occurrence of experience during sleep can be reported under ideal
reporting conditions.
FIGURE 1 | The methodological background assumptions behind
scientific dream research.
method of timed awakenings from rapid eye movement (short:
REM) sleep “furnishes the means of determining the incidence
and duration of periods of dreaming” (Aserinsky and Kleitman,
1953, p. 274; my emphasis). Similarly, in an article titled The
relation of eye movements during sleep to dream activity: An objec-
tive method for the study of dreaming, William Dement and
Nathaniel Kleitman stated that “the results of these experiments
indicate that dreaming accompanied by REM’s and a low-voltage
electroencephalogram occurred periodically in discrete episodes
during the course of a night’s sleep” (Dement and Kleitman, 1957;
p. 345; my emphasis).
It is noteworthy that the authors of both articles used the cor-
relation between eye movements during sleep and retrospective
dream reports to infer a direct association between the phys-
iological characteristics of REM sleep and dreaming. Likewise,
subjects’ frequent inability to report dreams following awaken-
ings from periods of sleep lacking REMs (or NREM sleep) was
interpreted as strong evidence for the absence of dreaming during
NREM sleep. This is not to say that dream reports were regarded
as stand-alone evidence of previous dreaming; clearly, the signif-
icant association with eye movements and EEG measures of high
cortical activity supported their reasoning. Yet, it is equally clear
that reports of dreaming and of nondreaming were afforded equal
prima facie credibility and that this assumption was crucial for
establishing the association between dreaming and REM sleep,
as well as the absence of dreaming during NREM sleep, in the
first place4. These early researchers very naturally took the asso-
ciation between dream reporting and dreaming to be such that
reports after awakening licensed direct inferences about dream-
ing (or its absence) in the preceding sleep stage. Consequently, we
can now say that the transparency assumption extends to reports
of nondreaming as well, thus giving rise to the further assump-
tion that dreams, at least under ideal conditions (e.g., following
timed awakenings in the sleep laboratory), are reportable expe-
riences during sleep (see Figure 1; cf. Windt, in press). Indeed,
4Note that most contemporary dream researchers accept that dreams, at least
occasionally, occur during all stages of sleep (Nielsen, 2000). Because the deep
stages of NREM sleep, in particular, lack the wake-like EEG activity that char-
acterizes REM sleep, the claim that dreams occur in these stages of sleep is
exclusively based on dream reports. In fact, it has been suggested that con-
trasting reports of dreaming and nondreaming from NREM sleep may be a
particularly fruitful method for identifying the correlates of dreaming within,
rather than across, sleep stages (Noreika et al., 2009).
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this suggests that the endorsement of all three assumptions is nec-
essary for saying that dream research, as opposed to research on
dream reports, is possible.
An obvious objection would be that this formulation is too
permissive: subjects often say that they have forgotten parts of
their dream and they may even have the impression of having
had a vivid dream without being able to remember any details at
all. In one study, more than a third of reports from NREM sleep
described such white dreams (Noreika et al., 2009). This suggests
that the reportability assumption should not be understood as
demanding that all details of an experience can be reported upon
awakening: after all, one can report the occurrence of a detailed
experience without being able to give an equally detailed report.
Reports are descriptions, and they will necessarily be incomplete
and selective. Yet, assuming that dreams are at least in principle
reportable experiences (or that they could be reported under ideal
reporting conditions, for instance following timed awakenings
in the sleep laboratory) is an important condition of possibil-
ity for scientific dream research: without it, dream experience
becomes decoupled from the primary sort of evidence used for
its investigation.
SKEPTICISM ABOUT DREAM REPORTING
The claim that scientific dream research is constrained by the
space of reportable dreams under the assumption of transparency
may sound preposterous. While there is widespread agreement
that scientific consciousness research requires the systematic inves-
tigation of subjective experience, the development of valid first-
person methods is often considered as one of its main challenges
(Dennett, 1991; Varela, 1996; Thompson, 2007; Overgaard et al.,
2008; Froese et al., 2011). If first-person reports turned out to be
systematically unreliable (Schwitzgebel, 2011), or if phenomenal
experience turned out to be too elusive to be cognitively accessible
and hence reportable, this would threaten the possibility of scien-
tific consciousness research altogether (Block, 2007, 2011; Cohen
and Dennett, 2011).
In this climate, the prospects for scientific dream research may
seem particularly bleak. While recent decades have seen a sharp
increase in publications on consciousness, the same has not been
true for dreaming, and the fields of dream and consciousness
research are largely separate (Wamsley, 2013; Windt, in press).
Dream researchers themselves have long portrayed the reliance on
dream reports as a weakness, suggesting that in order to make real
progress, the trustworthiness of dream reports would have to be
verified by independent means or that dream research should aim
to move beyond dream reports altogether (e.g., Hall and Van de
Castle, 1966; Winget and Kramer, 1979; Leclair-Visonneau et al.,
2010). In philosophy, two main types of skepticism about dream
reporting can be distinguished. The first accepts that there is a
deep, perhaps even conceptual connection between dreaming and
dream reporting, but argues that this very fact speaks against,
rather than for, a naturalistically minded approach to dream-
ing and its occurrence during different sleep stages (Malcolm,
1956, 1959/1962; Squires, 1973, 1995; McFee, 1994; Schröder,
1997). The second regards the question of dream experience as
an empirical question, but claims that dream reports are too
untrustworthy to study dream experience in any detail (Dennett,
1976; Schwitzgebel, 2011; Rosen, 2013). Either way, the strat-
egy of using dream reports for the scientific investigation of
conscious experience during sleep is threatened. This section dis-
cusses three particularly prominent versions of skepticism about
dream reporting and shows that they all, if successful, would have
consequences beyond dreaming for the use of first-person reports
in consciousness research.
NORMANMALCOLM’S REJECTION OF DREAM EXPERIENCE
In the late 1950s, and in direct reaction to the study by Dement
and Kleitman discussed above, Norman Malcolm mounted his
attack against the experiential assumption of dreaming by apply-
ing a particularly strict type of verificationism to the concept of
dreaming. Following Wittgenstein (1953), Malcolm assumed that
the meaning of a concept is wholly determined by the criteria
used for its ascription. On this view, the concept of dreaming is
special because it has no present-tense behavioral criterion: the
sole criterion of dreaming is the retrospective report of having
dreamt. “What we must say, although it seems paradoxical, is
that the concept of dreaming is derived, not from dreaming, but
from descriptions of dreams, i.e., from the familiar phenomenon
that we call ‘telling a dream”’ (Malcolm, 1959/1962, p. 55; cf.
Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 184). Consequently, there can be no ongo-
ing behavioral evidence for saying that a person is now asleep and
dreaming: any such behavior (such as sleeptalking) would show
that the person was, in fact, partially awake. Though we use the
same language to describe dreams and waking experiences, “it is
fruitless to argue that this identity of language is due to an iden-
tity of experience that lies behind it” (Malcolm, 1959/1962, p. 94):
“If a man had certain thoughts and feelings in a dream it no more
follows that he had those thoughts and feelings while asleep, than
it follows from his having climbed a mountain in a dream that
he climbed a mountain while asleep” (Malcolm, 1959/1962, pp.
51–52). Descartes’ (1641/1901) worry that we are deceived by our
dreams is, according to Malcolm, incoherent: one cannot, while
dreaming, mistakenly think that one is awake: “to a person who
is sound asleep, ‘dead to the world,’ things cannot even seem”
(Malcolm, 1956, p. 26).
Malcolm’s rejection of the experiential assumption is based on
purely conceptual considerations: “if a person is in any state of
consciousness it logically follows that he is not sound asleep”
(Malcolm, 1956, p. 21). While dream reports, as the sole criterion
of dreaming, are transparent with respect to dreams by matter of
logical necessity, this does not entail (and indeed precludes) their
transparency with respect to subjective experience during sleep.
Indeed, the very idea that dream reports literally reveal what was
experienced during sleep is misconceived: “To find out one dreamt
the incident is to find out that the impression one had on waking
is false” (Malcolm, 1959/1962, p. 64).
Importantly, Malcolm’s analysis of dreaming amounted to a
wholesale rejection of the very possibility of scientific dream
research. In particular, he accused Dement and Kleitman of
replacing the retrospective criterion of dream reporting with a
new, physiological criterion. By introducing REM sleep as a third-
person observable, present-tense criterion for the occurrence and
duration of dreams, they had not only deprived dream reports
of their sole authority, but had changed the concept of dreaming
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itself. The very project of conducting scientific dream research
beyond the mere study of dream reports was, to Malcolm,
founded on a misconception of the nature of the concept of
dreaming. In trying to investigate dreaming in the laboratory,
these researchers had inadvertently changed the explanatory tar-
get from dreaming to something else.
Malcolm’s analysis of dreaming engendered an enormous
amount of criticism. Its early impact is reflected in Dunlop’s
(1977) collection of Philosophical Essays on Dreaming, and to
this day, most philosophical publications on dreaming discuss
his views at least in passing. For present purposes, the most
important point is that the debate about Malcolm’sDreaming can
be described as a proxy war on more general issues. As several
of Malcolm’s critics pointed out, his views not only failed with
respect to the concept of dreaming in particular, but because they
assumed an overly strict brand of verificationism, an implausi-
ble account of meaning and justification, and misconstrued the
nature of philosophical methodology.
The description of the debate on Malcolm’s Dreaming as a
proxy war is nicely reflected by Hilary Putnam: “Why is it impor-
tant to show that Malcolm is wrong? Malcolm’s is the sharpest
statement of Verificationism in the 1950s. If Malcolm is right,
then the ‘naïve’ way of understanding our language and our
knowledge is wrong” (Putnam, 1986, p. 306). This is not the place
to enter into a discussion on the relationship between meaning,
linguistic intelligibility and justification. For present purposes,
it is sufficient to note that Malcolm’s argument depends on an
implausibly strong form of logical behaviorism and that without
it, his skeptical arguments about dreaming and dream reporting,
as well as his reasons for denying the possibility of scientific dream
research, evaporate. That this is indeed the case was an important
result from the critical literature. For instance, Putnam notes that
linguistic intelligibility does not depend on criteria with which
the truth of a sentence can be verified with absolute certainty, but
on its “ability to occur in coherent and appropriate discourses,
on paraphrasability” (Putnam, 1986, p. 309). Similarly, Chihara
and Fodor accuse Malcolm of misconstruing the nature of justi-
fication. Justification cannot be made contingent on criteria, but
rather depends “on appeals to the simplicity, plausibility, and pre-
dictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a whole” (Chihara
and Fodor, 1965/1977, p. 197). Consequently, the experiential
assumption can no longer be ruled out as a matter of logical
necessity and, contra Malcolm, it is not at all clear that psycho-
logical sentences lose their meaning when applied to dreaming.
It is also no longer clear that the use of physiological evidence
automatically changes the concept of dreaming. This is an impor-
tant first step toward making genuinely scientific dream research
possible.
In this context, note that the debate between Malcolm and
his critics can also be viewed as a proxy war on philosophical
methodology and the relationship between armchair conceptual
analysis, first-person reports, and scientific research. Deprived
of its basis in a convincing theory of meaning and justification,
Malcolm’s position is now revealed to result from a somewhat
arbitrary form of conceptual legislation. In particular, Malcolm’s
argument presupposes a misguided view of analyticity, according
to which philosophers conducting armchair conceptual analysis
have privileged access to deep conceptual truths that are hidden
to laypersons and researchers alike. As Putnam puts it, “the lexi-
cographer would undoubtedly perceive the logical (or semantical)
connection between being a pediatrician and being a doctor, but
he would miss the allegedly ‘logical’ character of the connection
between dreams and waking impressions. [. . . ] this ‘depth gram-
mar’ kind of analyticity (or ‘logical dependence’) does not exist”
(Putnam, 1986, p. 306).
The problem with Malcolm’s conceptual analysis of dreaming
and dream reporting, however, runs even deeper. Even grant-
ing, for the sake of argument, that dreams are not experiences
for conceptual reasons—or even that there is a conceptual con-
tradiction in saying that one had certain experiences during
sleep—this has no direct consequences for questions concerning
the phenomenology of dreaming. The experiential assumption,
as introduced above, is not about the conceptual, but about the
phenomenological analysis of dream experience, and a point that
Malcolm consistently misses is that there is simply no necessary
entailment from purely conceptual or analytic arguments to facts
about phenomenal experience. From now on, let’s call the practice
of deriving claims about phenomenal experience from concep-
tual analysis alone the fallacy from armchair conceptual analysis,
short the armchair fallacy 5. Asking whether a dream occurred
during a given period of sleep, or which types of imagery or emo-
tions occurred in a given in dream, is to ask factual questions
about what it is like to dream (or whether it was like anything to
undergo the preceding period of sleep); dream reports, under the
assumption of transparency, provide the primary type of evidence
for answering them. While there is certainly room for conceptual
questions regarding dream experience, such questions are, at least
in principle, wholly separable from questions about what it was
like to have the relevant experiences. As Nagel points out, “it is a
mistake to invest the demonstration that it is impossible to have
experiences while asleep with more import than it has. It is an
observation about our use of the word ‘experience’, and no more.
It does not imply that nothing goes on in our minds while we
dream” (Nagel, 1959, p. 114). Put this way, it becomes clear that
independently of whether or not we say that dreams are experi-
ences, this has no consequences whatsoever for the question of
whether or not dreams are phenomenal states. The experiential
assumption only says that dreams are experiences in the sense of
being phenomenal states, or that it is like something to dream.
On this view, it might seem that nothing much hangs on such
purely conceptual decisions. Yet, to the extent that a conceptual
framework—for instance for the description of dreams and their
relation to waking consciousness—aims to capture actual phe-
nomena, it should strive toward empirical plausibility. If this is
correct, then conceptual analysis not only fails to rule out the
possibility of scientific dream research—quite to the contrary, it
5The armchair fallacy is related to Dennett’s Philosophers’ Syndrome, or the
practice of “mistaking a failure of imagination for an insight into necessity”
(Dennett, 1991, p. 401). While both result from exaggerated confidence in
apparently necessary conceptual truths, the armchair fallacy does not result
from a failure in exercising imaginative abilities, but rather from a disregard
for the phenomenal character of experience, coupled with a tendency to derive
conclusions about phenomenal experience from conceptual analysis alone.
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should be informed by empirical research results. Ideally, a philo-
sophical framework should help structure the debate on dreaming
and thus facilitate an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to
dreaming and waking consciousness. At the very least, it should
not hinder this process.
My preliminary conclusion is that conceptually motivated
skepticism about dreaming and dream reporting, of which
Malcolm’s argument is a paradigmatic example, fails, and that it
does so for principled reasons. Yet, this failure is informative: it
shows that questions about dreaming and dream reporting can-
not be construed as purely conceptual questions, and it suggests
a more constructive way of describing the relationship between
philosophical analysis and scientific research.
DANIEL C. DENNETT’S CASSETTE THEORY OF DREAMING
Perhaps the second most influential publication on dreams fol-
lowing Malcolm’s Dreaming was Dennett’s (1976) article Are
Dreams Experiences?. Here, Dennett used an extended thought
experiment to propose an alternative to the received view of
dreaming. Importantly, his aim was not so much to answer the
question of whether dreams are experiences, but rather “to treat
the question itself as the specimen to be examined” (Dennett,
1979, p. 317). His main point was that this question cannot be
settled by armchair conceptual analysis or on the basis of sub-
jective testimony, but “only by the triumph of a good empirical
theory over rival empirical theories” (Dennett, 1979, p. 317).
Dennett (1976) begins by construing a maximally strong case
for scientific dream research. Having established the physiolog-
ical correlates of dreaming, such as REM periods and wake-like
EEG activity, a neurophysiological model of dreaming couldmake
all sorts of predictions about the occurrence, timing, and dura-
tion of dreams and perhaps even translate physiological measures,
such as REMs, into dream narratives. A sophisticated theory of
dreaming might eventually posit the existence of three separate
processes: a presentation process, which would be the physiolog-
ical correlate of the ongoing dream, a memory-loading process,
responsible for the subject’s ability to recall the dream upon
awakening, and a composition process, responsible for the com-
position of dream narratives. Once they had been identified, these
processes could be tampered with—possibly to the point of oblit-
erating veridical dream memories and substituting them with
undreamed but nonetheless recalled dream narratives (Dennett,
1976, p. 156).
Next, Dennett suggests a more parsimonious view requiring
only two of these processes. On the cassette theory of dreaming,
an unconscious composition process during REM sleep pre-
pares ‘dream cassettes’ for instantaneous insertion into memory
upon awakening. While the cassette theory could accommodate
all available physiological data on REM sleep, as well as the
occasional incorporation of external stimuli into dreams and
the apparent content-relativity of REMs (the so-called “scanning
hypothesis”), it is radically different from the received view of
dreaming in an important respect: “on the cassette theory it is
not like anything to dream, although it is like something to have
dreamed. On the cassette theory, dreams are not experiences we
have during sleep; where we had thought there were dreams,
there is only an unconscious composition process and an equally
unconscious memory-loading process” (Dennett, 1976, p. 161).
Dennett’s key claim is that everyday experience could provide
no evidence for or against this theory: ex hypothesi, the subject
reporting a dream would be incapable of distinguishing real and
instantaneously inserted dream memories.
On its face, Dennett’s analysis of dreaming is less radical
than Malcolm’s in that it does not outright deny the experiential
assumption. Because Dennett insists that the experiential charac-
ter of dreaming is an open question, the experiential assumption
might even turn out to be correct. On second sight, however,
Dennett’s view is at least as damaging to the transparency assump-
tion of dream reporting asMalcolm’s, because it denies that dream
reports have any evidential status with respect to previous dream
experience whatsoever. Note that even if the experiential assump-
tion turned out to be correct, dream reports would not, indeed
could not play any evidential role in showing this to be the case.
Dennett (1976, p. 159) points out that he chose the cassette the-
ory precisely because of its counterintuitivity: if we cannot even
rule out such a radically different theory of dreaming based on
subjective dream recall, then dream recall is wholly irrelevant to
the question of dream experience. Seen in this context, Dennett’s
argument is not so much a version of skepticism about dream-
ing as about dream reporting. Unlike Malcolmian skepticism,
Dennett regards the question of dream experience as a wholly
empirical matter, leading to the demand for a science of dream-
ing that solves the question of dream experience without ascribing
any evidential role to dream reports. On this view, dreaming is not
only wholly separable from dream recall on the level of concep-
tual analysis, but the scientific study of dreaming is also, at least
potentially, methodologically independent of the study of dream
reports. Dennett even states under which conditions the experi-
ential assumption might be confirmed: “If it turns out that sleep,
or at least that portion of sleep during which dreaming occurs, is
a state of more or less peripheral paralysis or inactivity; if it turns
out that most of the functional areas that are critical to the gover-
nance of our wide awake activity are in operation, then there will
be good reason for drawing the lines around experience so that
dreams are included. If not, there will be good reason to deny that
dreams are experiences” (Dennett, 1976, p. 169).
At this point—and indeed this is the way Dennett’s challenge
to the received view of dreaming is sometimes portrayed—one
might argue that the cassette theory has turned out to be empir-
ically invalid (Revonsuo, 2006, p. 77). Three lines of evidence
are relevant. First, imaging studies have shown that REM sleep
is characterized by a shift in regional activation patterns com-
pared to wakefulness and/or NREM sleep (Dang-Vu et al., 2007;
Desseilles et al., 2011). Specifically, the pons, thalamus, temporo-
occipital, motor, as well as the limbic and paralimbic areas
(including the amygdala) are highly activated during REM sleep,
while the dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior parietal cortices are
comparatively quiescent. This activation pattern fits in nicely with
the predominance of visual and motor imagery during dreams,
the frequency of intense, often negative emotions and cognitive
deficits such as the loss of self-awareness, mnemonic deficits and
the delusional belief in the reality of dream events. According to
Allan Hobson’s prominent model of dreaming, brain-stem driven
internal signal generation, combined with muscular atonia or
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REM sleep paralysis, contributes to the sensory input/motor out-
put blockade, explaining how rich internal experience combines
with behavioral passivity and lack of responsiveness to external
stimuli (Hobson et al., 2000).
A second line of evidence comes from lucid dreams.
Experienced lucid dreamers can not only become aware of the fact
that they are dreaming during the dream state, but also often have
some level of dream control (LaBerge et al., 1981; LaBerge, 2007).
Importantly, they are able to control the direction of their eye
movements during their lucid dreams, and because these dream-
eye movements correspond to real-eye movements and are clearly
identifiable on the EOG, lucid dreamers can use previously deter-
mined eye movement patterns to communicate to researchers, in
real-time, that they are now lucid and engaging in certain lucid
dream experiments. This suggests that certain kinds of behavioral
reports are possible even during the dream state. Note, however,
that in order to rule out false positives, retrospective confirmation
is required (Erlacher et al., 2003; Dresler et al., 2011, 2012).
A third line of evidence comes from dream-enactment behav-
ior (Nielsen et al., 2009), most prominently seen in patients with
REM sleep behavior disorder (RBD; Schenck and Mahowald,
1996; Schenck, 2005; Leclair-Visonneau et al., 2010). These
patients show complex behaviors such as running or fighting
off an attacker during REM sleep, and they often report dreams
involving the same actions after awakening. Due to the loss of
muscular atonia during REM sleep, they appear to be literally
acting out their dreams.
Taken together, all of this suggests that there is now physi-
ological and behavioral evidence supporting the occurrence of
dreams during sleep and thus speaking against the cassette theory
of dreaming. Or does it? Note that Dennett’s thought experiment
is constructed in such a way that the cassette theory is supposed
to be able to accommodate all of the findings of future dream
research. For the sake of argument, let us consider how the deter-
mined skeptic might respond to these three putative arguments
for the experiential assumption. On the cassette theory of dream-
ing, findings on regional shifts in brain activation patterns from
imaging studies would be attributed to an unconscious compo-
sition process during sleep. Nothing in these imaging data, or
so the proponent of the cassette theory might argue, requires a
conscious presentation process during sleep. Two types of objec-
tions might be raised against evidence from lucid dreaming. One,
lucidity could be explained by saying that the unconscious com-
position process inserted “traces of itself into the recording via
the literary conceit of a dream within a dream” (Dennett, 1976, p.
161), thus resulting in the impression, after awakening, of hav-
ing been able to “tinker” with or control the ongoing dream.
Eye movement signals might be explained in the same manner.
Two, and perhaps more importantly, the skeptic might grant that
lucid dreams are experiences, but deny that findings from lucid
dreaming can be generalized to nonlucid REM dreams. Indeed,
one recent study suggested that lucid dreams do not, as previ-
ously assumed, occur in unequivocal REM sleep (LaBerge, 1990),
but rather in a hybrid state between dreaming and wakeful-
ness (Voss et al., 2009), so caution about generalizations seems
warranted. Finally, similar concerns could be voiced about the
example of dream-enactment behavior. Again, the skeptic could
either propose that this behavior was caused by or perhaps even
left traces in the unconscious composition process, thus explain-
ing why the retrospective dream report described exactly the same
behavior, or he might grant that dream-enactment behavior is
related to real dream experience, whilst denying that the same is
true for ordinary dreams in healthy subjects. Perhaps, only lucid
dreams, or only the dream-enactment dreams of RBD patients,
are conscious experiences during sleep.
Note that my purpose in strengthening the case of the
Dennettian skeptic about dream reporting is not to suggest that
this position is, in fact, correct. My point here is more subtle. In
particular, I want to suggest that once the skeptical challenge to
the transparency assumption arising from the cassette theory has
been accepted—that is, once it has been accepted that the ques-
tion of dream experience is an empirical question that has to be
resolved without granting evidential status to dream reports—
there is no conclusive way to rule out the cassette theory6. Hence,
contrary to Dennett’s position in Are Dreams Experiences?, the
question of dream experience is not a genuine empirical question.
This reading is also compatible with Dennett’s use of a
thought experiment that is highly similar to the cassette the-
ory in Consciousness Explained. Here, he raises the question of
whether we are able to distinguish between genuine and hal-
lucinated memories (Dennett, 1991, pp. 115–126). Referring
to Orwell’s (2012) 1984-scenario of history being rewritten by
the Ministry of Truth, Dennett identifies “Orwellian revision”
with post-experiential memory revision and contrasts it with
the “Stalinesque method” of staging show trials based on false
confessions and fictive evidence. While Orwellian revision and
Stalinesque show trials both aim at the production of mislead-
ing archives, there seems to be a clear–cut difference between
the retrospective fabrication of historical accounts and the actual
staging of simulated events. According to Dennett, it is, however,
an illusion to believe that this distinction between pre- and post-
experiential memory production can be applied “all the way in”
and on a very small time scale. “Here the distinction between
perceptual revisions and memory revisions that works so crisply
at other scales is no longer guaranteed to make sense. We have
moved into the foggy area in which the subject’s own point of view
is spatially and temporally smeared, and the question Orwellian
or Stalinesque? loses its force” (Dennett, 1991, p. 119). As is the
case for dreaming, the subjective indistinguishability of these two
possibilities leads Dennett to identify conscious experience with
the production of memory traces: “The Multiple Drafts Model
makes “writing it down” in memory criterial for consciousness
[. . . ]. There is no reality of conscious experience independent of
the effects of various vehicles of content on subsequent action
(and hence, of course, on memory)” (Dennett, 1991, p. 132). On
this view, conscious experience is probe-dependent; it cannot be
conceived of independently of reporting (cf. Dennett and Akins,
2008). It is interesting to note that on this level, Dennett endorses
something similar to the transparency assumption. However, he
does so only with respect to a drastically altered conception of
6Indeed, Squires (1973) argues that the experiential assumption should be
rejected because it cannot be straightforwardly confirmed by empirical
evidence.
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experience, according to which experience is made contingent
upon retrospective report, rather than conceived of as separate
from it.
The application of the same kind of thought experiment to
reports of waking experience suggests that for Dennett, the prob-
lems raised by dreaming and dream reporting are no different
from those presented by waking experience. Dreams are par-
ticularly vulnerable to skeptical objections because we can only
report them retrospectively after awakening—but they are not
uniquely vulnerable (cf. Dennett, 1976, p. 166). Once again, the
philosophical debate on dreaming appears to be a proxy war for
broader questions concerning the relationship between conscious
experience, memory, and first-person reports.
My preliminary conclusion is that the attempt to construct the
cassette theory as an empirically valid alternative to the experi-
ential assumption fails: doing so leads to an insoluble form of
skepticism. Yet, this seems to leave the received view of dream-
ing in an equally vulnerable position, because it suggests that
no straightforward empirical defense of dream experience and
dream reporting is forthcoming. Consequently, the finding that
empirical evidence cannot distinguish between skepticism and
anti-skepticism about dream reporting appears to be equally
damaging to both views.
ERIC SCHWITZGEBEL ON DREAM COLOR
In a number of recent publications, Schwitzgebel has defended
“blanket skepticism” (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2007, p. 234)
about first-person reports. He repeatedly contrasts his view with
Cartesian dream skepticism, claiming to raise doubts about cur-
rent conscious experience as “the last refuge of the skeptic against
uncertainty” (Schwitzgebel, 2011, p. 117): “There are major lacu-
nae in our self-knowledge that are not easily filled in, and we
make gross, enduring mistakes about even the most basic features
of our currently ongoing conscious experience, even in favorable
circumstances of careful reflection, with remarkable regularity”
(Schwitzgebel, 2011, pp. 118–119; my emphasis).
For present purposes, his argument is interesting not only
because he is one of the few philosophers to explicitly defend a
strong version of skepticism about first-person reports, but also
because, like Dennett, he takes dreaming to be a particularly clear
example of their untrustworthiness. Schwitzgebel’s skepticism
about dream reporting is, however, more limited in scope because
it is restricted to the question of whether we dream in color or in
black and white. Based on a review of historical studies on color in
dreams, he found evidence for “an arc of opinion: before scientific
psychology, a consensus or assumption that dreams are colored;
divided opinions into the early twentieth century; a consensus
that dreams typically have little color from about 1930 to 1960;
and then a sudden overturning of that consensus in the 1960s”
(Schwitzgebel, 2011, p. 5; cf. Schwitzgebel, 2002).
Schwitzgebel suggests three possible interpretations of these
findings. The first is that dreams, influenced by the rise first of
black-and-white and then color television, changed from colored
to black and white and back to colored. Second, media expo-
sure may have influenced only people’s reports of dreaming in
color while leaving their dreams themselves unchanged. Third,
dreams might be indeterminate with respect to color, i.e., they
might be neither black and white nor colored. Again, the change
from black-and-white to color media may have influenced only
the way dreams are reported.
Note that these three different interpretations amount to dif-
ferent skeptical scenarios regarding judgments about colored
dreaming. The strongest skeptical challenge arises from the third
possibility: if dreams are neither black and white nor colored, then
reports of colored or black and white dreaming are generally mis-
taken. By contrast, if the second possibility turned out to be true,
only one group of people—either those reporting colored dreams
or those reporting black and white ones—is mistaken. And on
the first interpretation, changes in reports of colored dream-
ing would not warrant any doubts about the trustworthiness of
dream reporting.
Schwitzgebel repeatedly (2002; 2011; Schwitzgebel et al., 2006)
describes the possibility of a change in dreaming as opposed to a
change in dream reporting as unlikely, defending the claim that
either all or a certain group of subjects have mistaken opinions
about the occurrence of color in their dreams. The deeper point,
however, is that because all three interpretations are possible, and
given that none of them can be ruled out at the outset, this finding
itself undermines, or so it might seem, the transparency assump-
tion with respect to reports of colored dreaming. Schwitzgebel
recommends agnosticism about colored dreaming: “I don’t know,
and you probably don’t know, whether we dream in color or not.
Although I have found in conversation that most people answer
confidently when asked about the coloration or non-coloration of
their dreams, that confidence is misplaced” (Schwitzgebel, 2011,
pp. 3f).
Schwitzgebel’s skepticism derives its force from the fact that
it is neither based on conceptual considerations nor on a hypo-
thetical thought experiment, but on actual empirical findings.
His position is also special in that it has prompted a num-
ber of follow-up studies, including his own (Schwitzgebel, 2003;
Schwitzgebel et al., 2006). At the same time, it is not clear that
his argument targets the transparency assumption as defined here
at all. Consider the following passage: “Although many morn-
ings I remember a dream or two—and sometimes they seem to
have been quite vivid—I can’t tell you whether those dreams are
in color. The historical swings in opinion about black-and-white
vs. color dreaming suggest that I am not singularly inept, and
that incompetence in assessing the coloration, or lack of it, of
our dream life is fairly widespread, despite the considerable con-
fidence people often exhibit when questioned on the matter. We
don’t know the phenomenology of dreaming nearly as well as we
think we do” (Schwitzgebel, 2011, pp. 14, 15).
Here, it becomes clear that reading Schwitzgebel’s skepticism
about reports of dream color as threatening the transparency
assumption rests on an equivocation between two different ways
of knowing the phenomenology of dreaming, where one refers
to knowledge of particular dreams, as they are remembered and
reported upon awakening, and the other to general opinions
about dreaming, reached independently of individual instances
of dream recall. If his argument is intended as a critique of
the transparency of individual dream reports, rather than of
our general opinions about dreaming, then it does not follow
from the available evidence. In particular, the change from
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reports of predominately black-and-white to predominately col-
ored dreaming in the 1960s was accompanied by a shift from
questionnaire studies to studies relying on dream reports fol-
lowing REM sleep awakenings (Schwitzgebel, 2011, p. 2). As
Schwitzgebel himself points out, the only study to analyze the
occurrence of color terms in individual dream reports from the
1940s suggests that there was no difference in reports of colored
dreaming as compared to newer studies. Schwitzgebel concludes
that “although people’s opinions about their dreams changed
dramatically, their dreams remained approximately the same”
(Schwitzgebel, 2011, pp. 6f). Consequently, his position is best
understood as skepticism about opinions about colored dream-
ing only, to the effect that people are prone to error when asked
general questions about whether they ever, or frequently, dream
in color.
Next, note that Schwitzgebel’s argument for rejecting the view
that dreams changed in tandem with opinions about dream-
ing is precisely that the analysis of individual dream reports
from the relevant period suggests otherwise. Thus, his skepti-
cism about opinions about colored dreaming is based on the
transparency assumption for individual dream reports. More gen-
erally, this suggests that no principled version of skepticism
about dream reporting can be constructed by shedding doubt
on the relative trustworthiness of different types of reports:
In order to shed principled doubt on the trustworthiness of
dream reports in general, one would have to show that even
under ideal reporting conditions, subjects systematically mis-
describe their dreams. While Schwitzgebel presents convincing
evidence suggesting that people’s opinions about their dreams
are untrustworthy, he does not—and indeed could not—show
that the same is true for reports given under ideal reporting
conditions.
This is in keeping with the conclusions reached by a number
of researchers investigating the incidence of colored dreaming.
Importantly, these studies converge on the assessment that there
is a hierarchy in the trustworthiness of dream reports, with dream
reports following REM sleep awakenings generally being regarded
as the gold standard of dream reporting (Murzyn, 2008; Schredl
et al., 2008; Hoss, 2010). Hoss notes that reports of colored
dreaming are much more frequent following REM sleep awak-
enings in the laboratory than for spontaneously recalled dreams,
concluding that “attempting to capture the actual color origi-
nating within a dream may rely on REM awakenings” (Hoss,
2010, p. 89). Similarly, Schredl et al. (2008) found that reports
of black-and-white dream elements were dramatically reduced
when subjects were asked to describe the color of their dreams
immediately after awakening. By contrast, Murzyn (2008) failed
to find a significant difference between subjects’ responses to gen-
eral questionnaires about dream color and their individual dream
reports. Clearly, more detailed research investigating the accu-
racy of opinions and general assessments about dreaming (see
Domhoff, 2003 for a general discussion), as well as a more care-
ful and differentiated account of the trustworthiness of different
types of dream reports is needed. Yet, progress on these ques-
tions is only possible if one endorses the transparency assumption
for dream reports given under ideal reporting conditions: only
then does one have a standard against which one can measure
the relative trustworthiness of dream reports given under less than
ideal reporting conditions.
My preliminary conclusion is that a more constructive reading
of Schwitzgebel’s argument is to say that it raises the ques-
tion of when and under which conditions dream reports are
trustworthy. Indeed, this interpretation is in accordance with
Schwitzgebel’s own acknowledgement that “despite its untrust-
worthiness, introspection must be given a central role in the
study of consciousness. [. . . ] Behavior and physiological mea-
sures alone tell us nothing about consciousness unless it is estab-
lished that those measures correlate with conscious experience;
and introspection is the most straightforward way to establish
such correlations” (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2007, p. 53).
Understood in this way, moderate distrust about dream reports
is a valuable and potentially fruitful tool for developing a positive,
anti-skeptical account of dream reporting7.
WHY TO TRUST DREAM REPORTS
So far, we have seen that while the transparency and reporta-
bility assumptions are methodologically necessary for scientific
dream research, questions about the experiential character of
dreaming and the relationship between dreaming and dream
reporting cannot be resolved by conceptual analysis alone. The
demand for empirical evidence confirming the trustworthiness of
dream reports is equally misguided. The former strategy com-
mits the armchair fallacy, the latter leads to an insoluble form
of skepticism. Skepticism about dream reporting also cannot be
based on the disagreement between different types of reports
from different subjects, because any such argument will afford
prima facie credibility to certain types of reports 8. Here, an
important lesson is that contrasting contradictory reports can,
at best, suggest which types of dream reports are more trust-
worthy than others. Hence, any non-dogmatic, anti-skeptical
account of dream reporting will be cautiously and moderately
skeptical.
If questions pertaining to the trustworthiness of dream reports
are neither conceptual nor empirical, nor based on contradic-
tory reports then—absent further alternatives—there is a creep-
ing suspicion that the question of whether dream reports are
trustworthy in principle might be a pseudo-problem, an arti-
fact of a philosophical debate. Perhaps, construing the problems
of dream experience and of the transparency of dream reports
as genuine questions was misleading all along. This suggests
that the questions typically raised about dreaming and dream
reporting require reformulation. Rather than asking, Are dreams
7In Windt (in press) I argue that a similarly constructive reading can be
applied to Rosen’s (2013) narrative fabrication thesis of dreaming.
8One might object that if researchers found contradictory evidence, for
instance of colored dreaming, among reports elicited following REM sleep
awakenings, the situation would be different: in this case, this disagreement
would support principled skepticism about dream reporting. However, this
objection fails to acknowledge the possibility of genuine variability, e.g., in
colored and black-and-white dreaming, both between different subjects and
across different dreams. As Hohwy (2011) has argued against Schwitzgebel,
variability in experience reports provides no grounds for distrusting reports,
because this reported variability is equally well, or perhaps even better,
explained by variability in experience.
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experiences?, and Do dream reports reveal what it is like to dream
(or whether it is like anything at all)?, we should ask, What does
science reveal about dream experience?, and Which types of dream
reports reveal what it is like to dream?.
Anti-skepticism about dream reporting is indebted to the dif-
ferent variants of skepticism about dream reporting in important
respects. From Schwitzgebel’s argument, it inherits the insight
that not all dream reports are equal in their trustworthiness. From
Malcolm’s analysis of dreaming and Dennett’s Multiple Drafts
Model, it inherits the assumption that there is indeed a deep
and unbreakable link between dreaming and dream reporting, as
well as the insight that in talking about dream experience, we are
always only indirectly doing so, via dream reports. Yet, according
to anti-skepticism, the nature of this connection is methodologi-
cal, rather than conceptual or empirically investigable.
If this is correct, can anything positive by said in favor of anti-
skepticism? Without a positive account in its support, it may seem
that it is a simple act of desperation, resulting from the insight
that no empirical corroboration of the trustworthiness of dream
reports is possible. I want to argue, however, that a better and
more satisfying account of the transparency assumption exists, and
one that can provide it with a sound theoretical justification. In
particular, I want to suggest that the transparency assumption is
the best explanation of dream reporting. This is an initially attrac-
tive move, because inference to the best explanation (IBE) has
been suggested as a powerful response to Cartesian dream skepti-
cism (Russell, 1912/1999, p. 9; Vogel, 1990; Briesen, 2008). I claim
that it provides an equally powerful response to the skeptic about
dream reporting. FollowingMackonis (2013, p. 977), the standard
form of IBE can be reconstructed as follows:
The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
No available competing hypothesis can explainC as well as A does.
Hence, A is true.
Applied to the transparency of dream reports, the initially surpris-
ing fact is the observation that people report vivid experiences
upon awakening. But if these reports were transparent in the
sense that they referred to experiences occurring during sleep,
they would be a matter of course. The next crucial step is to show
that this is a better explanation than alternative hypotheses (cf.
Harman, 1965). In the case of dream reporting, this could be
Dennett’s cassette theory of dreaming, according to which dream
reporting results from memory insertion, or the possibility, sug-
gested by Schwitzgebel, that certain subject groups systematically
misdescribe their dreams as colored (or as black and white) due
to media influence 9. Only if the transparency assumption better
explains the surprising fact of dream reporting, is the inference to
its truth warranted.
What, then, makes one explanation better than another? There
is widespread agreement that the overall goodness (or loveli-
ness, as Lipton puts it) of an explanation depends on its scope,
9Because the cassette theory poses the more radical threat to the received view,
and because Schwitzgebel’s skepticism has already been restricted to opinions
about colored dreaming, I focus on the former example here.
precision, simplicity, and consistency with background knowl-
edge (Lipton, 2000, 2004; Mackonis, 2013). To begin with, the
transparency assumption is indeed simpler than the view that
dream reports are the product of memory insertion, for on the
latter view, one would have to claim that while waking experience
reports are the result of normal memory consolidation processes,
dream reports result from non-standard memory consolidation
processes such as memory insertion10.
The received view also does a better job at explaining why
dream reports describing roughly the same types of experiences
as occur during wakefulness are preceded by roughly the same
types of brain activity as is correlated with such experiences in
wakefulness, hence allowing for a more unifying account of neu-
roimaging findings. Similarly, if the skeptic accepts evidence from
lucid dreaming and dream-enactment behavior in RBD as show-
ing that these dreams are experiences, his denial that the same
is true for standard dreaming appears increasingly contrived and
limited in scope.
The greater scope and consistency with background knowl-
edge also allows for more precise predictions. For instance, it pre-
dicts that memory consolidation processes are state-independent,
remaining the same across the sleep-wake cycle. While this is an
empirical question, Marzano and colleagues argue that “the cur-
rent EEG results, in suggesting that the mechanisms involved in
encoding and recall of episodic memories across wakefulness and
sleep are the same, undoubtedly strengthen the general notion of
a continuity between waking and sleep” (Marzano et al., 2011, p.
6681). It also predicts that a cessation of dreaming should present
independently of deficient memory. Indeed, there is evidence that
a cessation of dreaming can present independently of amnesia
(Solms, 1997), and even that amnesia patients can report sleep-
onset imagery similar to that of healthy subjects (Stickgold et al.,
2000). On the cassette theory, which reduces dreaming to wak-
ing memory, this seems utterly mysterious. Finally, Schwartz and
Maquet (2002) have suggested that the similarity between dream
bizarreness and neuropsychological syndromes associated with
circumscribed brain lesions might be used to predict regional
changes in brain activation during preceding REM sleep peri-
ods (e.g., reduced activation in V4 during achromatic dreams).
While this has not yet been investigated, an exciting study by
Horikawa et al. (2013a) suggests that by mapping dream reports
onto brain activity, such predictions might indeed be confirmed
(see the section “The Way Forward: Consequences for Scientific
Dream Research”).
To this reasoning, one might object that I am treating pre-
cisely those arguments as supporting the transparency assumption
that above (in the section “Daniel C. Dennett’s Cassette Theory
of Dreaming”), I claimed would not satisfy the skeptic. And
while this is true, note that the significance of these arguments
10Recall, however, that Dennett takes the opposite to be true, because he
claims that the received view requires a presentation process in addition to
a composition and a memory-loading process. I do not think, however, that
proponents of the received view need accept the claim that ongoing dream
experience is wholly separate from dream composition: perhaps, the dreamer’s
ongoing expectations and emotional reactions shape the unfolding dream
narrative. Lucid control dreams would seem to support this view. See Windt
(in press) for a detailed discussion.
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has changed along with the reinterpretation of the transparency
assumption in the context of IBE. While these examples do not—
indeed could not—present independent evidence corroborating
dream reports, they do contribute to an overall explanatory
framework that is made possible by the transparency assumption
in the first place, thereby also increasing its overall explanatory
loveliness. This central insight is nicely formulated by Putnam:
“assuming that dreams take place ‘in physical time’—i.e., that
they start and stop at some time or other—various things become
inductive evidence that correlations hold: correlations between
the things we do with our eyes, muscles, vocal cords, as we
sleep and the dream events; and correlations between the neu-
ral processes that normally go with “seeing” certain things and
dream events” (Putnam, 1986, p. 317). Making certain default
assumptions about dreaming and dream reporting, then, is not
at odds with scientific dream research—it is the very condition
for investigating dreams in a naturalistic framework. Within an
IBE framework, this strategy is justified, in part, by its success.
As Froese and colleagues note, “one effective way to evaluate the
scientific validity of the phenomenological results of first- and
second-person methods is to see whether they help us to do better
science or not” (Froese et al., 2011, p. 39).
An important consequence is that the explanatory goodness
of a given explanation is a revocable property. It is always pos-
sible that a better explanation might come along (van Fraassen,
1980) or that an alternative explanation is better supported by
future findings. Consequently, a prediction for future research
is that because the transparency assumption makes new forms
of evidence about dreaming and dream reporting available, its
explanatory goodness should further improve over time.
THE WAY FORWARD: CONSEQUENCES FOR SCIENTIFIC
DREAM RESEARCH
Anti-skepticism about dreaming and dream reporting aims to
put skeptical worries about the trustworthiness of dream reports
to rest and to provide theoretical justification for the methods
employed in scientific dream research. Its contribution to scien-
tific dream research, consequently, is purely theoretical. It does
suggest, however, a particular reading for report-based studies of
dreaming. In particular, it frees scientific dream research from
providing an answer to what can now be seen to be a miscon-
strued question: dream research cannot, and need not, provide a
positive answer to the philosophical question of whether dreams
are experiences, nor need it rule out skeptical hypotheses such
as Dennett’s cassette theory (cf. Kramer, 2007) 11. Skepticism
about dream reporting is a philosophical problem; it is not, how-
ever, exclusively a philosopher’s problem. In particular, dream
researchers, by portraying their reliance on dream reports as a
weakness and proposing different ways of corroborating or even
moving beyond dream reports, occasionally make dream research
appear more vulnerable than it is, thus inadvertently perpetuating
skeptical doubts. It is true that scientific dream research cannot
prove dream reports to be trustworthy; but this is neither due to a
11The same applies to older theories claiming that dreams occur instanta-
neously at the moment of awakening, such as the Goblot theory; (see Kramer,
2007, pp. 17–31 for discussion).
shortcoming of particular research findings, nor to the poor trust-
worthiness of dream reports, but to the fact that the demand for
empirical corroboration itself is misguided.
A more productive question for scientific dream research,
and one on which much progress has been made, is under
which circumstances dream reports should ideally be gath-
ered. Importantly, the transparency assumption should not be
construed as lending undifferentiated support to the transparency
of all dream reports, but is restricted to dream reports gathered
under ideal reporting conditions. What exactly these conditions
are is an important empirical question. Many factors influence
differences in dream recall, such as setting, method and tim-
ing of awakening, interpersonal situation, the precise wording of
questions asked, etc. (Hall and Van de Castle, 1966; Winget and
Kramer, 1979; Domhoff, 1996, 2003; Kramer, 2007), and their
investigation will likely place further constraints on the condi-
tions under which dream reports should be elicited. For present
purposes, the main lesson is that this question is wholly sep-
arate from philosophical problems pertaining to the principled
trustworthiness of dream reports.
Yet, some general remarks are possible. First, there is
widespread agreement that ideal reporting conditions depend on
a principle of temporal proximity: the smaller the temporal lag
between dreaming and dream reporting, the more trustworthy
the report. This is why laboratory awakenings are taken to be the
gold standard of dream reporting (e.g., Schredl, 2010).
Second, different types of reports can be fruitfully compared to
each other in order to determine their relative trustworthiness. On
this view, transparency is not an all-or-nothing affair; rather, the
relative transparency of different types of dream reports is deter-
mined by their ability to approximate that of dream reports gath-
ered under ideal reporting conditions. This is important because in
most studies, reporting conditions are, in fact, less than ideal: lab-
oratory studies of dreaming are too costly and time-consuming to
be widely available, and the laboratory situation itself may have a
disturbing effect on dreams (Schredl, 2010).
Third, determining ideal reporting conditions may be closely
related to the level of detail and specificity required by a given
study. Returning to the debate on dream color, Schredl et al.
(2008) found that the percentage of reports describing black-and-
white dreaming not only dropped for dreams reported immedi-
ately upon awakening, but also when subjects were presented with
the option that they may have forgotten dream color. Relatedly,
Murzyn (2008) found that between 10 and 20% of subjects
reported mixed dreams involving both colored and black-and-
white elements. Because this result is so unexpected, neither
forgetting, nor wake-state bias, nor media influence seem to be
likely explanations. Generally, asking subjects to report specific
aspects of their dreams, for instance by using affirmative probes
or questionnaires about individual dreams, rather than asking
them to give detailed free dream reports, can change theoret-
ical thinking about dreaming considerably (cf. Nielsen, 2010):
Merritt et al. (1994) found that the frequency of reported dream
emotions increased 10-fold when subjects were asked to report
their emotions on a line-by-line basis compared to free dream
reports, suggesting that the prevalence of emotion was underes-
timated in many earlier studies. Generally, requiring too much
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detail might decrease motivation or lead subjects to forget or
underreport those aspects that researchers are really interested in.
For instance, asking subjects to keep a simple checklist log of their
dreams may be the best method for assessing spontaneous dream
recall frequency (Zadra and Robert, 2012), but would be wholly
inadequate for investigating subjects’ dreams in any detail.
Aside from detail and specificity, dream reports also differ as
to their expressive granularity 12. For instance, a subject might
give a detailed and specific verbal description of visual dream
imagery, but still be unable to express certain aspects of the expe-
rience. Here, the expressive granularity of reports can be increased
by asking subjects to produce dream drawings or compare their
dreams to photographs with different degrees of color saturation,
brightness, and clarity (Rechtschaffen and Buchignani, 1992).
Very generally, one might say that an important goal for scien-
tific dream research consists not only in determining the relative
transparency of different types of reports and improving report-
ing conditions, but also, ultimately, in using dreams reported
under (approximately) ideal reporting conditions tominimize the
gap between reportable and actually reported dreams. Because
the reportability assumption says that dream research is method-
ologically constrained by the space of reportable dreams and
that any claims about unreportable experiences are unscientific,
improving reporting conditions is an important strategy for map-
ping and analyzing the space of reportable dream experience as
systematically as possible.
Another interesting question is how scientific dream research
can profit from the broader debate on first-person reports. A par-
ticularly promising perspective, and one that might counteract
researcher-induced bias, might be for researchers to collaborate
with the participants of a given study when developing the cate-
gories or questions that later structure their dream reports. This
method has been successfully used in experimental neurophe-
nomenology (Lutz et al., 2002; Thompson, 2007). A similar strat-
egy was used in a self-observation study of hypnagogic imagery,
where different categories of sleep-onset experiences were cor-
related with neuromuscular events and EEG measures (Nielsen,
1991–1992, 1995). Sleep onset may be a particularly promising
target for mapping fine-grained EEG stage scoring to fine-grained
experiential categories (Hori et al., 1994).
A related question is whether the trustworthiness of dream
reports can be improved through training. Cultivating a disci-
plined approach to experience, as in certain contemplative tra-
ditions, may stabilize attention to ongoing experience and render
first-person reports more accurate (Varela, 1996; Overgaard et al.,
2008). Lucid control dreams might be a particularly promising
candidate. Yet, the reliability of different induction techniques
is variable (Stumbrys et al., 2012) and it is unclear whether
the results from lucid dreaming can be generalized to nonlucid
dreams (Voss et al., 2013). In nonlucid dreams, the attenua-
tion of reflective thought, memory and control over attention
and volition (Hobson et al., 2000) makes ongoing introspec-
tion impossible. So while subjects can certainly be trained to
be better dream reporters, it is not clear that training has any
direct and controllable effect on dreaming, at least not without
12I borrow this term from Sascha Fink.
changing the target phenomenon. On the plus side, this ensures
that dream experience is largely undisturbed as it unfolds and
thus protected from many of the pitfalls of ongoing introspec-
tion in wakefulness (Lyons, 1986)13. In this respect, dream reports
are better compared to paradigms using immediate retrospection,
such as Hurlburt’s descriptive experience sampling (cf. Hurlburt
and Schwitzgebel, 2007 for a critical discussion).
Another particularly intriguing area of research, and an impor-
tant step toward the integrated investigation of dreaming and
waking experience, is the comparison of reports across the sleep-
wake cycle. This method has already been used to investigate
the frequency of thinking and hallucinations across the sleep-
wake cycle (Fosse et al., 2001) and could also be applied to the
comparative study of dreaming and waking imagination or mind
wandering (Wamsley, 2013; Fox et al., 2013). But it could also
be used to investigate, in a systematic and controlled manner,
whether dream recall really is the fleeting, unstable phenomenon
it has often been described as. A possible outcome could be that
dream reporting is, in fact, no less trustworthy than reporting
waking experience. Rechtschaffen, one of the pioneers of dream
research, suggests as much, claiming that “When laboratory sub-
jects are awakened from the REM stage of sleep, they generally
have little difficulty in giving a fairly long, detailed report of
dreams, with transcripts sometimes running to several typed
pages. Indeed, it is often easier to get detailed, articulate reports
of ASCs [altered states of consciousness] than detailed reports of
normal waking consciousness” (Rechtschaffen, 1975, p. 143). At
least two studies suggest that this observation can be confirmed in
controlled studies. Stickgold et al. (2001) collected a total of 1748
reports from 16 subjects over a period of 14 days. During the day-
time, subjects responded to a pager, at night, their sleep stages
were monitored by a nightcap sleep monitoring system. Aside
from between-subject variation, they found that median report
lengths varied more than 2-fold over the sleep-wake cycle, with
REM reports being the longest, followed by reports from active
wakefulness, quiet wakefulness, NREM sleep, and sleep onset.
This finding has recently been replicated by Siclari et al. (2013).
In addition, when they asked their subjects how far back in time
they could recall the content of experience and how rich and com-
plex it was (measured by how long it would take to recount it),
they found the same pattern, with the highest rating occurring
for REM sleep reports. If such findings were further substantiated
in the future, might this suggest that dreaming, far from being a
particularly clear target for skepticism about first-person reports,
is in fact more readily recalled than waking experience? Whether
or not this is the case, engaging in such comparative studies of
dream and waking experience reports only makes sense on the
transparency assumption.
Finally, it has long been suggested that given the uncertainties
inherent in dream reporting, progress might ultimately be made
13A related question is whether the efficiency of studies can be improved by
using subjects with high dream recall. Given the apparently poor association
between dream recall frequency and personality traits, there seems to be a
case for using high recallers (Domhoff, 2003); however, it is also possible that
different people have different types of dreams, and Ruby et al. (2013) recently
found evidence for neurophysiological trait differences between high and low
recallers.
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by avoiding the study of dream reports altogether. In 1966, Hall
and Van de Castle wrote that “conceivably, advances in instru-
mentation will eventually permit dreams to be ‘televized’ as
they are being dreamed. If this time ever comes, we will no
longer have to ask people to tell us their dreams because we
can record and study the dream exactly as it was experienced”
(Hall and Van de Castle, 1966, pp. 18–19). A similar idea under-
lies Revonsuo’s (2006, pp. 300–303) science fictional thought
experiment involving the so-called dream-catcher test, in which
he envisions researchers constructing a 3D model of a subject’s
dreams based exclusively on measures of brain activity and com-
paring it to a 3D model based exclusively on data gathered from
dream reports (for a similar proposal, see Perogamvros, 2013).
Again, a recent study seems to suggest that this is not pure sci-
ence fiction. Horikawa et al. (2013a) gathered approximately 200
reports from sleep onset from 3 subjects sleeping in an fMRI scan-
ner.Words describing visual scenes or objects were extracted from
the reports and mapped to a lexical database. Then, internet pho-
tos corresponding to the visual object categories (or synsets; see
Figure 2) were shown to the participants while they lay awake in
the scanner, in order to train a computer program to associate
the object categories to specific patterns of activity in the visual
cortex. Based on a further round of sleeping in the scanner and
dream reporting, the researchers then used this program to pre-
dict with around 60% accuracy the visual objects described in the
dream reports14.
Does this suggest that researchers might indeed move beyond
dream reports in the future? This is not the place to engage
in science fictional predictions as to whether “dream reading”
independently of dream reporting might someday be scientific
practice. I merely want to point out that in developing such tech-
nologies, dream reports play an indispensable role both during
training sessions and to establish the accuracy of the researchers’
predictions. At present, predictions only count as successful if
they are confirmed by dream reports. Far from corroborating
the trustworthiness of dream reports, dream reports, under the
assumption of transparency, corroborate the accuracy of the
predictions and thus are instrumental in developing “dream-
reading” technologies in the first place. It seems, then, that at least
tesnysesaBdroWtropeR
Well, what was that? Two male
persons, well, what was that? I
cannot remember very well,
but there were e-mail texts.
There were also characters.
E-mail address? Yes, there were
a lot of e-mail addresses. And
twomale persons existed.
Male
person
Text
Character
Male (male person)
Writing (written material,
piece of writing)
Character (grapheme,
graphic symbol)
FIGURE 2 | Example of a dream report used in the construction of a
“dream-reading machine” (Horikawa et al., 2013b, p. 25).
14The reconstruction of dynamic visual images based on imaging data from
waking brain activity obtained during the presentation of YouTube movies
was first achieved by (Nishimoto et al., 2011).
in this respect, the methodological background assumptions of
scientific dream research have not changed since the discovery of
REM sleep in the 1950s—though they are certainly being put to
innovative and exciting uses.
Another point, however, may be even more important. Above,
I noted that anti-skepticism about dream reporting predicts that
as dream research progresses, the explanation it provides of dream
reporting should further improve. Horikawa et al. (2013a, p. 640)
note that because they were able to successfully predict visual
dream experiences from cortical activity patterns observed during
visual stimulus presentation in wakefulness, their findings sup-
port a “principle of perceptual equivalence,” according to which
perception and dream imagery share a common neural substrate.
Because only one previous study involving signal-verified lucid
dreams investigated the brain activity underlying specific dream
contents (Dresler et al., 2011), the importance of this finding is
hard to overestimate. Assuming that they accurately predicted not
just dream reports, but visual dream experience, this would be
an important step toward enriching an account of which types of
experiences occur in dreams, and of how to relate dream expe-
rience to standard wake states (Windt and Noreika, 2011). By
the same token, it would also increase the loveliness of anti-
skepticism and its ability to provide a unified explanation of
reports of dream and waking experience.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I used different variants of philosophical skepti-
cism about dream reporting to defend a positive account of the
trustworthiness of dream reports. According to my anti-skeptical
account, dream reports, when gathered under ideal reporting
conditions, are trustworthy with respect to conscious experience
during sleep. The transparency assumption initially has the status
of a methodologically necessary default assumption, but is theo-
retically justified because it offers the best explanation of dream
reporting. Seen in this way, it is the condition of possibility for
scientific dream research. While this is a decidedly anti-skeptical
view, it inherits important insights from the discussed variants
of skepticism about dream reporting, such as the recognition of
a close, unbreakable connection between dreaming and dream
reporting and the view that not all dream reports are equal in their
trustworthiness. While the questions of whether dream reports
are trustworthy in principle and whether dreams are experiences
are shown to be misguided, many more specific and empirically
investigable questions concerning the ideal conditions of dream
reporting or the question of which experiences occur in dreams
can now be formulated, suggesting important perspectives for
future research and for the comparative study of dreaming and
waking experience.
I want to end on a more speculative note. A recurrent theme of
this paper has been that skepticism about dream reporting can be
regarded as a proxy war on more general issues. Skepticism about
dream reporting is typically raised in the context of more gen-
eral variants of skepticism about first-person reports, with dream
reports being regarded as a particularly clear and vulnerable tar-
get for skeptical attacks. Because all of the discussed variants of
skepticism about dream reporting generalize to skepticism about
first-person reports, and because they all fail with respect to
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dreaming, related worries about first-person reports in general
appear equally ungrounded. At the very least, it seems plausi-
ble to assume that the case for skepticism about first-person
reports cannot be made in any of the ways discussed here.
Consequently, if the philosophical debate on dream reporting can
indeed be regarded as a test case for skepticism about first-person
reports, then it might be promising to assume that my positive,
anti-skeptical account of dream reporting generalizes to first-
person reports of waking experience as well. If so, then perhaps
scientific dream research might be better described as a partic-
ularly clear example of the importance of trusting first-person
reports—if only because its central reliance on first-person
reports is perhaps even more obvious than for other branches
of consciousness research. At the very least, this hopefully sug-
gests that an integrated approach to first-person reports across
the sleep-wake cycle is a promising and important goal for future
research.
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